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Hermeneutic and ethnomethodological
formulations of conversational and textual talk
A. W. McHOUL
This paper attempts to render explicit, and then present a critique of,
certain affinities between hermeneutic and ethnomethodological work on
conversation/discourse that are tentatively raised in Misgeld's (1977)
discussion of Habermas and Gadamer. I begin by formulating the ways in
which this possible parallel could be construed both (a) by overlaying a
reading of Sacks's and Garfinkel's work onto Misgeld's consideration of
Habermas and Gadamer and (b) by taking up certain hints that Misgeld
makes directly about the relation of ethnomethodology and con-
versational analysis to the hermeneutic project. This is the first section of
the paper. It ends by posing certain gaps or omissions concerning the
questions of (a) the concept of 'rule' and (b) universals versus Open-
texture' in textual and/or conversational discourse. In the second section
the collective work of Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) is inspected for a
balanced account of the situation-specific/situation-free characteristic(s)
of talk and this is offered as a counterposition to Misgeld's synthesis of
Habermas and Gadamer, although it has several affinities with it. In the
third section an empirical analysis is presented by way of displaying the
Open-texture'/universals problem with respect to noncoversational
(textual, monologuic) discourse.
Formulation
Summarily, Misgeld offers an account of the differences between
Habermas's and Gadamer's theoretical reflections on discourse/conver-
sation that revolves around the question of a 'universal pragmatics'
(Habermas) as against a theory of the open-texture of talk. While
Habermas holds that the theorist can reconstruct a (possibly) ideal version
of communicative competence, realized as an ideal speech situation, which
is then held to exist independently of any actual occasions of naturally
occurring talk but to which conversational interactants must orient during
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the course of such occasions, Gadamer prefers to consider conversations
as highly occasioned performances that occur despite, rather than because
of, what interactants might deliberately do:
A fundamental conversation is never one that we want to conduct. Rather, it is
generally more correct that we ... become involved in it. The way in which one
word follows another, ... may well be conducted in some way, but the people
conversing are far less the leaders of it than the led. No one knows what will 'come
out' in a conversation. Understanding or its failure is like a process which happens
to us. (Gadamer 1975: 345; Misgeld 1977: 326)
So, while Habermas prefers to include a notion of deliberation, this
concept is markedly absent in Gadamer. Nevertheless, the conception of
conversation/discourse entertained by both theorists requires an occult
mechanism, where by Occult' I intend 'beyond or outside of human
construction': for Habermas this is an ideal-type formalization con-
structed in retrospect by the theorist but observably absent from actual
occasions; for Gadamer the occult mechanism is that of randomness, of a
highly occasion-specific negotiation between (or rather, despite the en-
deavors of) interlocutors on the basis of 'what happened so far' almost
without reference to 'what is to happen'. In this last sense, the question of
deliberation or its absence becomes irrelevant; for both Gadamer and
Habermas are prepared to remove from consideration the question of
what interactants might actually do on some occasion.
Now certain popular conceptions of ethnomethodology/conversational
analysis (e.g., Mehan and Wood 1975; Coser 1976) have argued that a
similar sort of contrast to the above can be drawn between the work of
Sacks, on the one hand, and Garfinkel, on the other. It is often said that
the work of Sacks and his colleagues turns on the question of the search
for universal rules of conversational interaction (pace Habermas) while
Garfinkel's approach remains an occasion-specific one. Certainly, where
Misgeld talks of Habermas as one who considers speakers to 'make
reference to' or Orient to' norms of discourse or sets of rules (Misgeld
1977: 325-326), we are very definitely reminded of Sacks's concern to view
conversational rules — the rules for turn-taking being a paradigmatic case
in point — as ones that are not necessarily Observable features' but that
are Observably oriented to' (Sacks, n.d., chapter 1: 4ff.). I.e., it is not
empirically the case that, in any given transcript, we can 'see' speakers
strictly observing, for instance, the One talks at a time' rule. Many cases of
overlapped turns are visible. However, Sacks et al.'s (1974) analysis
attempts to display that the production of features like 'gap' and Overlap'
is generated by an orientation to a One at a time' rule. I.e., the ways gaps
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and overlaps are done, the precise and orderly coproduction of the
conversational 'slots' in which they occur, appear to be in accord with a
general reference to the reconstructed turn-taking rules. In this respect,
conversational analysis has definite affinities with Habermas — one
symptom of this affinity being (in contrast with Gadamer) a preference on
the part of both for going so far as to talk about 'rules'. This affinity is not
directly spoken in Misgeld's text (indeed, Misgeld appears to consider
Sacks's work as part of the 'phenomenological' analysis of conversation
[1977: 343, fn.9]) but at the level of the comparison that Misgeld gears into
between Habermas and Gadamer — and at this level only — con-
versational analysis may be drawn into the range of candidates for
comparison. Below, I shall try to show that there are fundamental ways in
which the comparison (either of Sacks and Habermas or of ethnomethod-
ology and hermeneutics generally) does not hold; this will turn on the
question of formulations of the concept of 'rule' different from that of
Misgeld/Gadamer, where it is said that: 'Focusing on rules implies too
much emphasis on the competency of interlocutors of which they can be
assured, before they surrender themselves to the flow of arguments and
interpretive suggestions' (Misgeld 1977: 328; italics added). The key prob-
lem here will be whether or not a rule 'naturally' carries with it an exclusive
sense of 'before'.
By contrast with the approach that specifies occasion-independent
rules, Misgeld argues that Gadamer's conception of conversation and that
of Garfinkel share a parallel affinity. He (Misgeld) argues that, for
Gadamer, 'co-conversants do not know in advance what the conversation
in the end will come to' (Misgeld 1977: 326-327) and in the corresponding
footnote, he adds: 'This is a feature of conversations as well as of other
interpretive and sense-making practices [which] H. Garfinkel (1967[a]) has
made thematic as the temporal order of these practices. He calls it
"retrospective-prospective" sense making' (Misgeld 1977: 343). Now, when
we are deliberately thinking of the contrast with occasion-independent
approaches, the affinity holds good. Garfinkel has continued in his work
to stress the occasionedness of conversational and other practices and has
directly eschewed 'formalistic' approaches that take interactive occasions
Out of the hands of the interactants producing them. Indeed, his primary
notion of 'reflexivity' requires that what any occasion turns out to be
depends on what its participants coconstruct it as and vice versa. But, by
having taken things this far, the affinity begins to end. Sense-making, for
Garfinkel, is retrospective and prospective; while for Gadamer: 'con-
versants do not know in advance'. I.e., for Garfinkel, there is a reflexive
relation between 'what participants do' and 'what occasion this is' while,
for Gadamer, the interactive process lies absolutely out of the hands of
Brought to you by | Murdoch University Library (Murdoch University Library)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 7/13/12 4:27 AM94 A.W. McHoul
those who are, in Garfinkel's terms, its constructors. In no sense could
Gadamer's thesis that 'Understanding [...] is like a process that happens to
us' be directly transferred to the case with Garfinkel. The notion of
'reflexivity' (and its major realizations, such as the documentary method
of interpretation) is a primary blockage to any such candidate affinity and,
when this comparison is made and fails, the occult mechanism in
Gadamer's version of conversational interaction is manifest. Likewise,
where Gadamer eschews the concept of rule, Garfinkel remains prepared
to entertain it or its variants, with the proviso that we do not consider
'rules' as being formal, absolutely occasion-independent, or 'prior to' any
actual interactive situation that might occur.
Also: while there is a certain stylistic affinity between Habermas's and
Sacks's versions of communicative competence in terms of 'universal' or
Occasion-free' rules, Sacks (informed by Garfinkel's work) continually
stresses the importance of the use of rules in localities. Indeed, rules such
as the turn-taking mechanism (Sacks et al. 1974) are not products of
theorizing or of reflection in absentia from actual occasions, but are
produced from considerations of manifold empirical cases. The position
can be taken even further when we consider that the turn-mechanism is
characterized by Sacks et al. (1974: 725) as a "local management system,
and that it is an interactionally managed system'. I.e., the turn-taking rules
provide for possibilities in any given conversation in terms of what will
happen at the very next — on just this occasion — turn at talk; and what
selections from the mechanism are made by any spfcaker(s) will depend
exclusively on previous turns (especially the immediatley previous turn)
and on projected outcomes for subsequent turns (especially the im-
mediately subsequent turn). I.e., the way the mechanism operates — and
this is its primary usefulness for a sociology of conversations — is
occasion-dependent, and highly so. Considered as a mechanism, it merely
states the conditions and limits of possible modes of exchanging turns at
talk; and it is quite obvious that such a mechanism exists, insofar as turns
cannot be exchanged in just any fashion. Considered as a means of
orienting turns in their conversational course on some particular occasion,
the mechanism provides a knowable and known facilitator of the
collective construction of conversational occasions. Therefore, we come to
see that no contradiction is involved in the statement that conversational
rules are both context-free and context-dependent. Contradiction only
arises (in, say, the Gadamer/Habermas debate) where 'rules' are con-
strued as those sorts of formal recipes that have existence absolutely
independently of occasions of language use — for example, where the
model is transformational generative grammars.
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Upon consideration, then, the Habermas/Sacks and the Gadamer/
Garfinkel affinities do not come off as discrete analogies. Rather: on the
one hand, Habermas and Gadamer both prefer to theorize occult
mechanisms for conversation/discourse that are rendered problematic
when the reflexive relation of interactants, occasions, and rules is
overlayed on them; on the other hand, this very reflexive relation of rules
and occasions displays a greater affinity between Garfinkel and Sacks
than the implicit analogies we began with allowed for.
However, if we return now to the question of Open-texture' versus
universal rules of discourse generally, it can be discerned from Misgeld's
paper that there is a further problem in the Habermas/Gadamer debate
that the above initial formulation might cast some light on. The problem is
this: while Habermas holds that conversations may observably turn out to
be 'loose' with respect to the ideal situations that act as models for them
and that, by contrast, 'dialogue-free languages have complete order'
(Habermas 1973: 260; Misgeld 1977: 328), Gadamer prefers to see both
dialoguic and dialogue-free language situations as open-textured. In this
sense, he comes very close to much recent ethnomethodology, especially to
textual ethnomethodology (McHoul 1978a, b, c, forthcoming). The classic
contrast that is in the offing here is the distinction between conversational
and textual discourse. Misgeld's paper does not fully answer this problem,
but simply puts forward Gadamer's version of the interaction involved in
the hermeneutic relation between readers and the texts acting as their
'interlocutors'. In this version, the theory of Open-texture' is saved by
arguing that readers act on the instructions of texts as to what to find in
them; interpretation proceeds by a method analogous to the Gadamer
version of conversation; the outcome is not known in advance, only
previous 'bits' of text can inform us as to how to read those on the horizon.
Given this, we ought now to be able to reintroduce the key ethno-
methodological concept of reflexivity in order to decide in what ways
textual discourse has an Open-texture' and whether or not Gadamer's
conception of 'guidance by textual instruction' is overly one-sided in not
allowing for equal participation rights on the part of readers. Before we
can come to this, a further matter arises for our treatment.
In Habermas's view, we are invited to accept a typology of roughly the
following sort: that some languages (uses of language), typically dia-
logues, have a relatively loose or open structure while others, typically
texts, are the products of'complete order' and display that order. Whereas
Gadamer has cast suspicion on this typology by suggesting that textual
talk may partake of features 'normally' associated with dialoguic dis-
course, ethnomethodological and conversational analytic studies have
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begun to cast the entire typology into doubt. A summary of the genesis of
this critique might look thus:
(1) Garfinkel and Sacks's (1970) collective work on the interdependence of
occasioned and context-free features of rules can presumably have
application in respect to textual as well as dialoguic talk.
(2) The above receives some initial justification insofar as the above-
mentioned paper is equally content to talk of textual communications and
of conversational talk (e.g., the discussion of both Richards's and Rose's
glosses [Garfinkel and Sacks 1970: 343-366]).
(3) Sacks et al. (1974) discovered that local/interactive management and
the/?reallocation of interactional processes — such as turns at talk — does
not constitute a bipartition into types but a linear array along which
various kinds of talk can occur. Thus situations of talk may well be
locally- or pre-managed (natural conversation and debate being polar
extremes) or a combination of the two; or located on a continuum between
the two extremes (McHoul 1978d).
I have already attempted to break down part of this distinction by
showing aspects of premanagement in certain 'formal' occasions of
dialoguic talk (McHoul 1978d); what remains to be done here, therefore,
is a two-fold task comprising the second and third parts of this paper:
Theoretical: a fuller explication of points (1) and (2) above on the synthesis
of the occasion-dependent and -independent character of rules and
conclusions about language-use to be drawn from Garfinkel and Sacks's
collective work.
Empirical: in what sense can so-called nondialoguic (e.g., textual) uses of
language be seen to have an open, negotiated, or interactively managed
texture? Here an actual case of reading a newspaper article will be
scrutinized.
I take as my warrant for the performance of the above two tasks the fact
that Misgeld openly admits that the problems raised in his paper cannot
be solved by theoretical fiat, but by concrete studies. These studies', he
says:'... are not within the range of competence of the philosopher, unless
he is willing to be informed by studies of conversations [and presumably
other forms of talk] as daily courses of action. Sociological studies are now
underway and may permit a new formulation of this problem' (Misgeld
1977: 336-337). Again, in the corresponding footnote, Misgeld adds: Ί am
thinking of "conversational analysis" (the analysis of naturally occurring
conversations) which developed out of ethnomethodological sociology.
H. Sacks in particular was responsible for this development. For re-
ferences cf. Garfinkel/Sacks (1970)' (Misgeld 1977: 343).
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Counterposition
Theoretical problems of rule use
Let us begin with Misgeld's (1977: 330) overgeneralization to the effect
that Tor Wittgenstein ... the normal case of following a rule is a decisive
one'. We can crudely summarize a reading of the later Wittgenstein's work
as the attempt to consider language as a question of interrelated practices
or language-games and thereby to cut short the tendency in philosophy
and elsewhere to construe language as a definite and definable calculus,
analytically separable from the occasions of its use. This tendency was
called by Wittgenstein himself (1958: 18) 'the contemptuous attitude
towards the particular case' or 'the craving for generality'. In order to find
answers to puzzles regarding language — or to show theoretically
generated puzzles to be nonproblems — it is necessary, according to this
view, to locate particular cases of sites on which language is used. A nice
summary of this position is to be found in Wittgenstein's remark to
Malcolm (1958: 93): 'An expression only has meaning in the stream of
life.'
The practical ramifications of this position for any linguistic sociology
are that, no matter how much we hope to isolate 'universal practices' or
once-and-for-all 'rules of use' pertaining to interactions employing or
constructed in a linguistic medium (and constructed as, in large part, uses
of language), the actual practices and 'rules' we observe or discover will
turn out to be inseparable from particular occasions of their use. I should
like to take up here, insofar as it has wide ramifications concerning the
problems posed in the section above, this question of 'inseparability'.
From immediately above: a rule, as it were, is only a rule insofar as there is
a locatable occasion of a performance in accord with it and, for analytic
purposes, insofar as there are materials that preserve that occasion for its
later examination as rule-like. Yet is there not a discrepancy in saying, as
Wittgenstein may tempt us to do, 'a rule' and 'a (single) performance', in
that the very notion of 'rule' seems to require something we may gloss as
'reproducibility'? Can we (a social collectivity, a culture?) follow a rule
only once during our existence? Wittgenstein most certainly indicated
what the site of linguistic-sociological investigations should be (i.e.,
determinable occasions of use), but the problem of occasionedness versus
reproducibility still requires detailed examination. Here it is necessary to
look at ethnomethodology's formulation of the problem, a formulation
that attempts, as we have seen, not to construct the question in terms of
'either occasionedness or reproducibility'. In accord with much previous
ethnomethodological work, we shall find it valuable to hold here that
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apparently 'fixed' or 'independent' features can be construed as products
of the continual interactive work accomplishing them; these features then
reflexively providing the grounds for the very scenes in which they appear
as 'expectable' features.
Using a reading of specifically Sacks's
1 work on rules and the question
of 'rule', it can be said that while a description of some particular
occasion's — or occasion's participants' — procedures for the production
of that occasion — or occasion's Objects' — will be a context-sensitive
description and will thereby include the situationally specific work per-
formed by the participants (as and in that occasion), we must nevertheless
be able to say that this occasioned methodicalness constitutes a unique
and particular use of some more generally available device(s) or tech-
nique(s). Taking the 'principle' of reflexivity as an instance (Garfinkel
1967a: 7-9): we should have to say that an utterance or series of them may
be heard and produced as performing some action (e.g., 'questioning')
only in the ways that the utterance(s) comprise(s) an integral part of some
occasion where it was questioning that was observably and concertedly
done for and by its constructors. However, we might equally say that this
is the case only insofar as there are ways in which such utterances routinely
turn out to be thus. One (inconclusive) piece of evidence we have for
reproducibility across occasions and cohorts of 'the same' activity is that
activities get named or reported in the same way across occacions and
cohorts. That such 'naming practices' (investigable in themselves) may be
equally sensitive to the exigencies of particular occasions has been noticed
by Sharrock (1974: 49): '... the name is not to be revised in the light of
events but is, rather, to be invoked in the description of whatever events
occur'. Thereby, we might make an arbitrary division into context-free
devices or techniques and context-specific uses of them as 'the events'. The
point is this: on whichever side we situate ourselves as analysts with
respect to this division (pace Habermas/Gadamer), its arbitrariness will
ensure that we are always saying something relevant to 'the other side'.
The difference (for theory) is but one of emphasis and is therefore a
phenomenon entirely of the analyst and, more crudely, of practical
matters such as the stage a particular investigation has reached.
There nevertheless appears to be a discernible (but analyst-specific)
paradox: On the one hand, we want to be able to say something about the
methodicalness of ordinary activities that are performed (and consist in
nothing other than their being performed) on more than a single occasion
and are collected (by community members) under the same rubrics
('questioning', 'irony', 'reaching verdicts', etc.) on more than a single
occasion of their being competently done. On the other hand, the only
entry site for the analyst (pace Wittgenstein) must be some specific
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occasion(s). To construe this problem as that routinely encountered in
(social) science as 'generalizing from necessarily limited evidence'
2 is to
radically mistake the nature of the enterprise; for the question of
reproducibility in this case is one that has been shown by previous
ethnomethodological investigations to be a question not so much of
analytic nicety as of practical significance for those who would engage in
(and construct) everyday occasions and their Objects'. I will therefore turn
to Garfinkel's (1967b) and more particularly Garfinkel and Sacks's (1970)
work on reproducibility as a feature of the work of particular occasions.
Despite characterizations to the contrary (e.g., Coser 1976),
3 ethno-
methodology has but rarely concerned itself with the wwreproducible
features of specific occasions. Taking an early study like Garfinkel's
(1967a: 116-185) 'Passing and the managed achievement of sex status in
an "intersexed" person', we can note that the ethnographic details
furnished there, while in the form of a 'case study', attempt to discover
what is routinely done on more than a single occasion of 'passing as a
woman'. Collecting a policy for such research, Garfinkel (1967b) and
Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) have recommended that (the seemingly
researcherly) matters of the uniformity, typicality, and reproducibility
(and other terms that would specify the standardization of times, places,
and cohorts) of various mundane machineries (e.g., for questioning,
opening conversations, or arriving at verdicts) are matters that are
recognized as present by members producing such objects as 'questions',
Openings', and 'verdicts' on particular occasions of so doing. In short:
reproducibility is itself an occasioned accomplishement. Thus while
(following Wittgenstein) our site of investigation must be the in situ
methodicalness of any practice, much of the previously available analytic
work that has been done on such practices recommends that but one detail
of in situ methodical practices is that they are recognized, attended to, and
produced as practices that rely on reproducible or context-independent
methods. Garfinkel (1967b: 186) says that reproducibility, as one detail
among many of members' practices, is, like other details: 'acquired and
assured only through particular, located organizations of artful practices'.
In the later paper, Garfinkel and Sacks (1970: 346) collect reproducibility
along with 'uniformity ... repetitiveness, standardization, typicality, and
so on' as the INVARIANCE of everyday machineries across occasions.
To this they add INDEPENDENCE, or the nonrestrictiveness of methods
to particular cohorts (1970: 346). While methodical structures are in-
variant and independent ( = reproducible), they nevertheless remain
occasioned. They can only emerge as integral details of constructed in situ
occasions and as practical machineries for the here and now construction
o/such occasions. While we may wish to say that these machineries remain
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'knowable' as features for the constructability of 'the same' situation (past
or future), we cannot point to any evidence for their existence as, say,
mental structures, outside some occasion of their use. I.e., it appears that
the reproducibility of a practice (its rule-likeness) is only available where
that reproducible practice is being performed, and where that reproduci-
bility is a visible feature of its being occasionedly performed. While it may
be obvious to say that occasionedness is 'every particular cohort's
practical, situated accomplishment' (Garfinkel and Sacks 1970: 346), we
must also hold this to be the case, as do Garfinkel and Sacks, for
invariance and independence ( = reproducibility). In terms of policy, then,
our descriptions of members' machineries for the production of social
Objects' must be both context-sensitive and context-free, where 'context'
specifies particular spatial and temporal locations and a particular
production/reception cohort.
As far as analytic strategies are concerned, the phenomenon of
reproducibility leaves us with at least two choices:
(A) we can examine a number of candidate instances of some Object's'
production (say, conversational openings) relatively isolated from the rest
of the work that accompanies it as a 'whole' occasion or event and thereby
'sacrifice' some ofthat event's occasionedness (cf. Schegloff 1967, 1968).
In examining, say, conversational openings, we might 'miss', for instance,
a suicide threat or a means of making reference to persons as they were
performed in the conversations following our topicalized object Open-
ings'. In such an investigative instance, we will be concerned to find what
is uniformly done across many fragments of 'whole' events as 'the same
thing'.
(B) we can investigate some 'entire' event (a conversation, a reading)
where but one of the features of that event we shall be concerned to
describe will be its cohort's attention to the uniformity, typicality,
standardization, etc., of the ways they have for methodically producing
the several Objects' produced in and as that event.
Strategy 04) is closer to the methodology of Sacks's conversational analysis
and (B) is closer to Garfinkel's procedures; but there is no longer any
implication of the 'nature' of interaction in this distinction. It remains a
researcherly question. (A) will give us finer details of some everyday
machinery's rule-likeness, while (B) will give us a larger range of possible
machineries for investigation. It is quite obvious, then, that (B) can
usefully discover phenomena for later analysis by strategy (A) and is
therefore highly appropriate for beginning analysis of some topic. Despite
the apparent separateness of (A) and (B), if'Every social action attests to
the possibility of equivalent social actions' (Mehan and Wood 1975: 187),
then we are emphatically not dealing with two distinct forms of repro-
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ducibility; as it were, one attended by members on particular occasions
and one reconstructed by analysts on reviewing instances from more than
a single occasion. For, (1) while the machineries (methods) for the pro-
duction of 'equivalent' social actions are 'known' in practice, they remain
for their users unremarkable, taken-for-granted, seen-and-attended-to,
used-and-available, but unnoticed. And (2) without these characteristics
of reproducibility (invariance+independence) and unreworfcableness as
endogenous features of interactive occasions, each such occasion would
become a cultural shock. Therefore, (3) there is a requirement of (cultural)
sociology that it explicate these unremark-upon-able machineries by way
of a description of'how culture is done' and a further requirement that, as
cultural sociology, its eventual research program will be specifically con-
cerned to say something about the reproducibility of these machineries,
whether by strategy (A) or strategy (E) above. In the first instance (i.e.,
with respect to our final section's project) we require research strategies
for locating cultural machineries for the performances of reading texts.
I.e., we need to find what sorts of phenomena are on the agenda as at least
candidates for reproducible machineries^ first attempt at reading-analysis
would, therefore, preferably be done via strategy (B), insofar as a proliferation
of candidates might thereby be isolated. Consequent attempts could then
use this information in the performance of strategy (A), having discovered
what to investigate there and at least rudimentary findings about those
objects' methodicalness.
Machineries of cultural production
An entire industry of professional talk has centred on the question of
literature as 'cultural production' (McHoul 1978a: 155-237). From this
talk has arisen the central question of the sociology of literature, culture,
and the arts: what is the relation of a work to its 'producing' cultural
milieu, Zeitgeist, epoch, and so on (Schegloff 1972: 432-433) through a
variety of terms conceived as part/whole relations? While answers to this
question have been invariably proffered in terms of relations between a
text's content or form and the substantive (contentual or formal) 'facts'
of the time of the text's production, very little attention has been paid to
participants' constructions and reconstructions of a 'culture' as a series of
preferred practical methods for undertaking quite ordinary tasks as and in
that culture. Elsewhere (McHoul 1978a, b, c, forthcoming), I have as-
sumed that a sociology of literature (textual ethnomethodology) could be
established on this alternative basis, whereby the particular ordinary
activities in question would be members' dealings with (i.e., readings of)
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texts. Instead, then, of searching for parallels, homologies, and other
relations between discrete items or systems, such a sociology of literature
treats the practices of using (reading) texts as constitutive aspects of
participants' methodical ways of 'doing culture'.
Our position with regard to sociology of literature's central question
would then be: there is no relation of discrete entities, but (somewhat
cryptically) the culture is the doing of it in variously many ways (cultural
praxis), including the use of texts, as matters of ongoing and interactively
concerted work; this work requiring manifold machineries for its perfor-
mance. Further: details of the machineries employed by readers in using
texts and producing readings, so far as can be told from crude experi-
mental investigations (McHoul 1978a: 239-326), display resemblances to
the machineries used for doing other sorts of activities-as-and-in-a-culture
— especially those used in the production of natural conversations (Hatch
1978). The warrant for such a sociology of literature may be found in the
work of the later Wittgenstein and of many ethnmethodologists, but it
may likewise be found in Marx's 8th Thesis on Feuerbach: 'Social life is
essentially practical. All mysteries which mislead theory to mysticism find
their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this
practice' (Marx 1968: 30).
Given that strategy (B) was chosen above as our preferred present
policy, our projected inquiry would have to examine in situ occasions of
some readings as and in the full detail of their livedness; as and in actual,
as-far-as-possible-naturally-occurring, practically oriented, ordinary,
ongoing activities with specific temporal and spatial locations and specific
cohorts. By 'cohort' is intended: a specific production/reception popu-
lation of two, a reader and a text, where reader and text (in contrast to
Gadamer's thesis) concertedly produce a reading and where (in accor-
dance with Gadamer) a reader receives a text. However, by virtue of the
desirability of future research being performed via strategy (A), such a
sociology would also attempt to isolate, in those aspects of its description
dealing with the reproducible orderliness of those activities, at least
candidate details of them (rules) that are recognized and attended to by
the occasions' cohorts as independent of and invariant to those particular
cohorts and those particular spatial and temporal locations. The ultimate
objects of research are therefore (1) methods that 'hold good' for 'us' as
competent readers of texts across particular occasions of Our' reading;
and possibly (2) methods that hold good across particular occasions of
readerly and other (nonreaderly) activities such as conversing, queuing,
making purchases, and so on, including any social activity whCTe 'sense' is
made of some talk or action.
4 These 'ultimate' objects are well beyond the
scope of the present paper, though they indicate the 'natural' extension of
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this research program — what Lakatos (1974) calls a program's 'positive
heuristic'. The more pressing problem is the question of how the
guidelines for a reflexive analysis (where by 'reflexive' I intend to invoke a
constructive version of Turner's [1971] notion of the ineluctable use made
by investigators of their knowledge of and participation in social practice
[McHoul 1978a: 327-377]) may be put into service as a 'first attempt'
using strategy (B).
As a consequence, there is a research interest in finding, producing, or
otherwise collecting 'data' or materials that preserve the livedness of
occasions of reading. This interest requires that we collect analysables so
that prospective candidates for readers' methodical ways are answerable
to some actual materials at hand. Further, such materials should, where
possible, be 'strong' materials. I.e., they should preserve as fully as
possible the in situ livedness of the occasions that they can only be said to
're-present'. Insofar as they can never be those occasions but constitute,
for instance, reports, representations, reconstructions, reproductions,
mock-ups, recollections, or reexhibitions of them, I shall call them
'ethnographies' or natural histories. While there may be good grounds for
doubting the usefulness of the strong/weak distinction for ethnographic
materials,
5 we may still say that even the 'strongest' of them — such as
multicamera, split-screen, audiovisual recordings and their 'close'
transcriptions — are still not characterizable as the occasions but rather as
traces of the occasions. In another sense, they are 'merely' part of the very
orders of event they report.
Nevertheless, we have an interest in collecting ethnographies of reading
situations. This is for the reason that the rapidity with which ordinary
understanding/interpretive work takes place prevents its on-the-spot
analysis;
6 and such work as it is performed on and with texts and as
readings is apparently no exception to this. Obviously, no audiovisual
recording and transcription is going to provide such an analyzable
ethnography; so where are we to find our 'reminders'?
One possibility that could be considered is to comb the literature for
readers' reports on their readings. Some literary critics engage from time
to time, for their own practical and pedagogic purposes, in the production
of such reports.
7 Also, certain works prescribing reading methods
(Richards 1959; Adler and van Doren 1972) include useful ethnographic
materials. However, previous investigations (McHoul 1978a: 327-377)
have led to the point where a reflexive sociology of the analyst's own
reading(s) appears to have much to recommend it.
8 For this reason, I have
undertaken a first attempt at producing an ethnography (natural history)
relevant to this program. Somewhat unsuccessfully, I attempted there not
to do analysis of the reading itself, as it occurred, while acknowledging that
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any reader must perform analyses of the text or the textual utterances in
question. Below, I present first the ethnography and subsequently the text
used in its production. Thereafter an attempted analysis of the former
using strategy (E) above is undertaken.
Analysis
Ethnography
(1) Today is the 18th of October, 1977 and I am looking through a stack of
(2) old newspapers that have been lying around my office. I decide upon
(3) writing this ethnography for a reading of any article I should come across.
(4) I pick up a paper dated August 23rd 1976. It is the Canberra Times for
(5) that date. After a brief inspection of the cover I turn inside, skip page 2
(6) and turn to page 3. I notice a small article and decide to use it. I only
(7) notice its smallness in terms of column length; I don't begin to read it. I
(8) have decided that a short article might be best for this first attempt. The
(9) difficult thing is that I have to make a conscious effort not to do some kind
(10) of analysis, but just to report on the reading of it. There is a sort of effort
(11) of will involved.
(12) The article has the headline 'Key areas "safe"'. I am attracted by it. The
(13) title seems to be about nothing at all I could recognize as 'news' or
(14) remember as a current issue. I ask myself: What the hell's that about? It
(15) appears like a puzzle to me and I want to find out what's going on with it.
(16) I begin to look into the body of the article, the text of the item and the
(17) first sentence. I read it: The Prime Minister, Mr Fräser, said on Friday
(18) that...'.
(19) I check the date of the paper and find that it was Monday's edition. I
(20) take the 'Friday' to be the previous Friday, that is the 20th.
(21) The hardest thing is not to look down, to read on at normal speed,
(22) which would ruin my note-taking. I am aware of the tremendous speed at
(23) which reading, in all its complexity, is done. At the same time, I don't want
(24) to tease out things from the reading that I'm not doing in it (as it). There's
(25) a balance between doing this too slowly and too quickly.
(26) '... key areas in the Public Service would not be affected by the
(27) reductions in the number of public servants.' This is the end of the first
(28) sentence and of the first paragraph.
(29) So I've found what the mysterious 'key areas' are. Or rather what the
(30) 'areas' are: they are areas of the Public Service. But which such areas are
(31) 'key'? I've found some of the sense in which they (whatever they are) are
(32) 'safe', why 'safe' was in quotes in the headline. It was a statement: said to
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be 'safe', not are (definitely) safe. I've found who made the statement. Also (33)
where. But I've no clue yet as to the exact pertinence of his having to say (34)
this. I want an answer to the question 'Why?' Why is this news? Why is it a (35)
current issue? (36)
I ask myself: What reductions in the number of public servants? The (37)
article seems to take it that I will know about them already. That 'the' (38)
appears so sure. (Sure of itself?) I begin to think back to about the time, (39)
but nothing occurs. So I go outside the guidelines I've set for myself for (40)
this reading and check some other, earlier papers. Then the controversy (41)
comes to mind, as I see that the budget had just been handed down prior (42)
to this. There was a lot of trouble to do with the AGO A (Administrative (43)
and Clerical Officers' Association) fearing that jobs would be lost in the (44)
budgetary cuts to the Public Service. I remember the problem clearly and (45)
the talk that was going on among friends in the Service. I take it that I (46)
have found what it was that the article expected me to know. And that the (47)
article is meant to be read as one of a series or as a running-item — that (48)
the article is designed, up to now, for people who've done all that previous (49)
reading, for whom the issues would be fresh. I take it to be a follow-up (50)
report on matters of topical concern at the time, matters already known (51)
by readers of this newspaper, or who've been otherwise informed (on the (52)
radio, in chats, and so on). I read on: (53)
'Mr Fräser,' runs the next sentence (and I 'cheat' by looking down to (54)
see that it's also a paragraph) 'at a briefing in Canberra, said the new staff (55)
ceilings announced in the Budget would be achieved by normal wastage (56)
and not by retrenchments.' (57)
I was right. But then I wonder: If the article is taking it for granted that (58)
its readers are in the know about those 'reductions', why does it have to (59)
spell out just what reductions these are in this, the next line? I can see (60)
what's meant by 'safe' in the headline — or rather I've found more about (61)
their safety. It's kind of a qualification. Before, it said that the areas would (62)
not be affected. I'd taken this to mean that some ('key' — whatever this is) (63)
areas would be exempted, while others, presumably, wouldn't. Now I find (64)
that there will be reductions here but that the method of making them will (65)
be by 'normal wastage'. I take 'normal wastage' to be 'safe'. So the 'safety' (66)
has to do with someone's fears about losing jobs. I guess the AGO A, but (67)
the problem of all this 'spelling out' is a worry to me. (68)
I guess that some people would, as I did initially (prior to getting myself (69)
acquainted with the current issues), pick up the newspaper without (70)
knowing about all this, about the budget cuts to the Public Service, about (71)
the fears and so on. So I begin to reckon that the article is taking account (72)
of two possible sets of readers. The word 'populations' comes to mind. (73)
One of these is informed, in the know, and the other not so. I'm no longer (74)
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(75) doing a single reading. But this is what has turned out. (Like suddenly
(76) seeing the duck and the rabbit in the optical illusion). The question occurs:
(77) would the informed readers have gone on to this second paragraph/
(78) sentence? I acknowledge that I'm conjecturing about a reading, having
(79) found myself to be a member of what I've come to think of as the two
(80) possible groups. (I think there are probably others). I decide anyhow that
(81) they (the informed readers) would still read this second paragraph because
(82) of the fact that the 'safe' aspect of the headline is still not cleared up —
(83) although parts of the first paragraph could have been read as 'all there is
(84) to say' regarding the 'safety' aspect. Didn't I think this at the time? The
(85) piece about 'normal wastage and not ... retrenchments' gives the key to
(86) this; it is the additional information.
(87) I picture what is for me a typical 'informed', lower-grade public servant
(88) (i.e, one in possession of knowledge about these issues), eager for the news
(89) about his job. He'd know what 'the reductions' of the first paragraph
(90) were, but I figure he'd still read on to find out just what this 'safety' aspect
(91) was. He's found that certain jobs 'won't be affected' but the exact
(92) management of their 'being unaffected' is still unclear. How can it be that
(93) they're unaffected when there are going to be cuts? The second paragraph
(94) looks like it solves this apparent contradiction — a contradiction that
(95) could be read given only the headline and the first paragraph.
(96) I picture what is for me a typical 'not-in-the-know' reader, perhaps
(97) someone from an area, unlike Canberra, where the proportion of the work
(98) force not employed as public servants is high. I figure that he'd have to be
(99) able to recognize 'the Budget' as a current issue. I reckon that the article is
(100) taking the news down to a level of what readers would know about, given
(101) that there are at least two groups of readers. I remember that I'm not
(102) supposed to be doing analysis in this and so drop the thought. But
(103) something occurs to me about the 'geography' aspect. Why Canberra?
(104) Why not Canberra, A.C.T., so many miles from Sydney, Australia, etc? I
(105) think of it as being more evidence for taking these things down to a
(106) 'known' or knowable level. The news is not something as yet known. I
(107) finally repress my analytic tendencies. I'm annoyed with myself for
(108) departing from the ethnographic work.
(109) I prepare to read on, having found what key areas (though not yet what
(110) 'key' is), having found who said they were safe, how this 'safety' was
(111) meant, and so on. I remember that what had looked like a final statement
(112) on the 'safety' aspect (paragraph one) turned out to have more to it. So I
(113) prepare myself to have to read some further stuff on such things as 'the
(114) sayer', 'what "key" areas are', possibly even more on the 'safety' thing, or
(115) the still-open question of 'whose jobs?'. The next lines are:
(116) 'Public-service union officials commented after the Budget that services
(117) to the public may be badly affected by the staff reductions.'
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So I was right about the ACOA. But this sentence/paragraph only tells (118)
me that there's been some previous new about this. It says: This article has (119)
been part of a running-item. It discloses the content of some previous item
or items of news in the series. I reckon it would be no use at all to the
reader 'in the know' and that it's there to cover its own tracks, the article's (122)
tracks. By this I mean: on the one hand it has to be news, but it seems to be (123)
taking account of the fact that one group's news is another's old hat, (124)
depending on things that have happened outside the reading-at-hand (e.g., (125)
reading other, previous articles, chat, etc.). This paragraph is, I decide as a (126)
member of that population as well, definitely designed for the uninformed. (127)
It says nothing that further illuminates the headline unless the reader was (128)
bothered about the pertinence of Fräser having to say this, and an (129)
informed reader would know that anyway. I realize that what I'm saying (130)
sounds like the 'background- versus scene-dependent' distinction of one of (131)
my earlier papers,
9 and that the prospect of having to do analysis on this (132)
reading is 'coloring' that very reading. I try to stop. (133)
I think what this third paragraph is about is the addition of information (134)
that there have been some fears on the part of someone (the union (135)
officials) and that Eraser's statement was made in order to allay those (136)
fears. I can see both Eraser's speech and this article as 'allaying fears' — (137)
certainly the fears of the union officials — if they are successful — and (138)
possibly also the fears of the public. Perhaps, I think, 'key' areas are those (139)
that involve 'services to the public'. Of the fears: the background to these (140)
and these fears themselves will be either known or not known by the two (141)
populations of readers I've 'invented' in my reading. (142)
I stop reading and listen to the taped comments I've made as I was (143)
going along. I make notes that come out of immediate reflection upon (144)
what I've just done. I add these notes to a transcript of the tape at suitable (145)
points. The final version is this ethnography. (146)
Text
(1) Key areas 'safe'
(2) The Prime Minister, Mr. Fräser, said on Friday
(3) that key areas in the Public Service would not be
(4) affected by the reductions in the number of public
(5) servants.
(6) Mr. Fräser, at a briefing in Canberra, said the new
(7) staff ceilings announced in the Budget would be
(8) achieved by normal wastage and not by retrenchments.
(9) Public-service union officials commented after
(10) the Budget that services to the public may be badly
(11) affected by the staff reductions. (Canberra Times 1976: 3)
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In the ensuing analysis, passages from this text are marked as, for
example, '(t. 7-8)' while passages from the ethnography are marked as,
for example, '(e. 34-35)'.
Constructing the news: a provisional rule for the first moment of reading
The foregoing ethnography displays a richness of studiables. In saying
this, I intend to indicate the plethora of activities that can be made
'problematic' upon an inspection of the ethnography. These might be such
things as [[reading a passage as allaying fears]],
1
0 [[reading a passage as
news]], [[reading a passage as one of a series]], [[reading a passage as
paragraphed]], and so on. The following analysis concentrates maximally
on one specific Object' and its accomplishment. We can provisionally call
this [[reading a news item as scheduled]]. 'Scheduling' is used here to gloss
a process of sequential discovery that is narrated in the ethnography.
That process will be seen to entail methodical ways of connecting two
further accomplished Objects': [[reading a headline as introducing an
article]] and [[reading an article as being introduced by a headline]]. While
my formulation of these two Objects' tends to make them look identical
— a transformational generative grammarian would say, for instance,
that they are differing surface structures with identical deep structures —
it will be the purpose of this analysis to show how this 'sameness' is only
available once a good deal of methodical work has been performed in
order to accomplish it.
I intend, then, to make a problem of readers' work of [[taking a headline
to be an introduction to just this article]] and [[taking an article to be
introduced by just this headline]]. By 'headline' I intend, then, 'Key areas
"safe"'; by 'article', the body of the text following; and by 'item' or 'news
item*, the composite: 'headline + article'.
It would be a commonplace to say that the headline introduces the
article. But this commonplace disguises a problem for the reader in at least
this particular case. In lines 12-15 of the ethnography, he says that what
he calls a 'title' does not in fact, at that point in the reading, 'do titling' of
the item. It 'appears like a puzzle' to him (e. 15). He does not know 'what
the hell' it's about. Via an ongoing, temporally paced, or 'scheduled'
process of work he comes to find the solution to the puzzle — i.e., how it is
that the title 'does titling' and how the article is 'so titled'. How the
introduction performs its introductory work specific to just this article
only becomes clear once the article-it is 'assumed' (?) to introduce has been
read. And how the article can be read as introduced by just this title does
not become clear until the very last moment of reading. The first and the
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last moments of reading, thereby, mark not only the (physical) beginning
and end of the news item but also the beginning and end of a course of
understanding work, each of whose stages (including the first and the last)
are mutually dependent.
Considering the point at which the reader has encountered the headline
only, we can say that only at some future point, possibly the end of the
reading, by a retrospective sense of occurrence, can the headline and article
be read as mutually coherent or as acting as sense-making devices for one
another.
This may not be the case for every newspaper headline and article. The
matter seems to be one of degrees of transparency and opacity. For
instance, 'Fräser sees Kerr: Election date expected today' (Canberra Times
1977a: 1) can be seen to already comprise terms whose sense may be visible
for 'informed' readers, where 'informed' includes having information on
the context and pertinence of this particular prospective announcement as
news; e.g., that Fräser had 'kept refusing to confirm or deny' (Canberra
Times 1911 a: 1) that there would be an early election. Yet for the headline
in question here, and for others of similar degrees of opacity/transparency,
such as 'Bill for one head' (Canberra Times 1977b: 3), there is a marked
invisibility of their pertinence to any reader; their sense only being dis-
coverable upon the performance of a reading of the ensuing articles. I.e.,
'Fräser sees Kerr: Election date expected today', just here, on this date,
would be a relatively clear matter whether or not the whole of the news item
was read. Such (transparent) headlines appear as 'news in themselves' and
may be followed by further 'details' or 'news in itself. Obviously, for the
reading subject in question, 'Key areas "safe"' does not have this status.
(Neither would I want to suggest that this 'status' is something to do with
the 'words in themselves' over and above their specific historical and geo-
graphical location. Further, the difference is obviously one of degree and
not of some bipartition such as Objective/indexical'.)
We can also say, upon inspection of the ethnography, that the headline
is a [[preliminary guide]] (Hatch 1977: 6) to the article. It is 'preliminary' in
that it falls sequentially prior to the article and it is a 'guide' in that it gives
(or will be seen to have given) clues as to 'what the article is about'. But it
can, and hence the cautious parentheses above, only be read as 'having
been a preliminary guide to this particular article'. It becomes visible as a
[[preliminary guide]] only after this article has been read and, further, read
as the 'key' to the headline. Strangely here, 'preliminarity' is a matter of
gradual and for-the-future decidability. With respect to the headline,
then, our topicalized Object' becomes its [[becoming a preliminary guide
in reading]].
By contrast, 'prefaces', for example, do not typically display this
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feature. They appear to be matters of greater transparency, in that they
are expectably constructed in forms such as 'In the following we shall
discuss a, b, and c, and what is meant by a, b, and c is ...'. Prefaces are
typically specific and give useful information guiding readings of what is
to follow them from the very moment of their being read. Thus while the
'definitions' given in prefaces may be highly problematic and require that
later sense-making procedures be carried out upon them (in order to 'fill
them in'), at least we can say that the reading of 'preface+text' is
genuinely linear and step-wise; a gradual sense of their problematic items
(where these exist) being built up from that point. Our headline, on the
other hand, appears to have been dealt with in a specifically nonlinear,
continually retrospective manner. I.e., rather than 'instantly' beginning to
use the headline in order to understand the article, the reader here has to
conduct a course of understanding work in order to find out later how the
headline might be so used.
Again, we can say that the headline acts as a [[summary device]] in that,
like a preface, it summarizes what is to come. If asked, after reading the
article, what it was about, the reading subject could confidently reflect 'It
was about key areas being "safe"'. But again, the headline itself, as it
stands, at the point prior to the article's having been read, cannot yet tell
us how it is acting as a [[summary device]].
The above 'discovery', in itself, might be seen as a 'test case' for our
earlier remarks about occasionedness/reproducibility. For if the
headline's acting as a [[summary device]] can only be found by a process of
discovery work that eventually assures the headline's status as a [[summary
device]], then we, as analysts, become disturbed by the (non)question:
what is its status just there and then, in the first moment of reading, prior to
the body of the article having been read? We feel we want to cover the
possibility of its being 'senseless' by saying something like: that it is or will
be a [[summary device]] can be known in advance and only the occasioned
'how' of the matter is, for now, missing. We want to say that the reader
holds the assumption that it will be a [[summary device]] in some as yet
unknown ways even prior to a reading of the article; that he holds this
assumption at all times and only needs to take it Out of wraps' to confront
this particular occasion. We are drawn into thinking of a rule for headlines
that states that they are 'expectably summaries' that may be transparent
like prefaces or relatively more opaque (discoverable-as-summaries) like
'Key areas "safe"'. We feel almost confident in saying that we can take
this much as known and used by readers even prior to some particular
headline's being read. We want, in short, to underestimate the provisional
rule's occasionedness. It is as though readers contunually carry around
with them a predictive knowledge that they put to use on this or that
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occasion (McSweeny 1973), as the (objective) occasion demands. This
form of (Chomskian) mentalism takes it that a rule is the kind of thing
that can be held as innate knowledge, waiting in abeyance for some
appropriate occasion of its usability. It is possibly in such ways that
theoretical devices such as innateness or the unconscious get generated.
On these theses, the occasion and the use of the rule appear entirely
separable, in that the objective occurrence of the occasion (i.e., its
nonparticipant-constructed occurrence) constitutes merely a 'signal' for
lifting the innately or unconsciously stored rule Off the mental shelf. But
Wittgenstein has pointed to a peculiarity of rules that countermands such
an occult position: i.e., that they remain occasioned as well as repro-
ducible. That is, we do not, in any acceptable use of the word, know the
rule and its applicability outside some actual occasion of its use, while its
existence as a rule ensures its usefulness across a number of particular
occasions. In order to balance rules' characteristics of occasionedness and
reproducibility we should need to say both (1) that a particular occurrence
of a rule's use will not admit us immediately to all such occasions, and
concomitantly (2) that 'knowing the rule' will not mean that we are
preprepared for some particular occasion of its use, prior to (or Outside')
that occasion being interactively constructed here and now. We covered
the first aspect in the second section above. Wittgenstein anticipated the
second aspect when he gave the example of the 'rule for a series of
numbers'. A teacher asks a student to continue a series of numbers by
adding 2 at every point. 'Add 2' may be the (or an) expression of the rule
in this case. Wittgenstein asks of the teacher: 'So when you gave the order
4-2 you meant that he [the student] should write 1868 after 1866, and
100036 after 100034, and so on — an infinite number of such pro-
positions?' (Wittgenstein 1953: # 186). Wittgenstein talks of this as being
misled by the grammar of 'to know' and
 4to mean':
For you don't want to say that you thought of the step from 1000 to 1002 at that
time — and even if you did think of this step, still you did not think of other ones.
When you said
 CI already knew at the time ...' that meant something like:
 4If I had
then been asked what number should have been written after 1000,1 should have
replied "1002"'. And that I don't doubt. (Wittgenstein 1953: #187)
Normative conceptions of (linguistic) action such as the theory of ideal
speech situations, Chomskian linguistics, symbolic interactionism, Levi-
Straussian structural analysis, Barthesian semiology, etc. demand that
rules have an essential quality — almost in the Platonic sense — that
guarantees their being continuously known and available in advance
and/or (mentally) stored. For ethnomethodology, however, rules, while
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reproducible, are specifically occasioned. I.e., they exist in no essential
mode but rather in a praxiological mode, insofar as they are regularly seen
to constitute part o/the detailed work of accomplishing an occasion rather
than being lifted from some sphere considered as independent of such
occasions (and where such occasions are, concomitantly, considered as
Objectively' constituted). The distinction between cognitive and in-
teractive uses becomes irrelevant. Yet, in one sense, the normative
paradigm is correct: rules occur as 'appropriate' to situations. In another
it is incorrect, for situations are not merely given but are reflexively
constituted by such things as 'following rules'. In the normative paradigm
'appropriateness' is a matter of 'matching'; for ethnomethodology the
'matched' features are reflexively constituted. Therefore, it becomes
possible to say that 'appropriateness' is no longer a matter of matching
independent equipments and occasions but a matter of continual reflexive
interplay between mutually constitutive occasions and equipments.
Care should then be exercised in considering rules as questions of
'knowledge', where this requires some kind of mental baggage over and
above 'the ability to go on'. Wittgenstein asks: '... what does this
knowledge [the application of the rule of a series of numbers] consist in?
Let me ask: When do you know that application? Always? day and night?
or only when you are actually thinking of the rule?' (Wittgenstein 1953:
# 149). Again: 'If there has to be anything "behind the utterance of the
formula" it '^particular circumstances, which justify me in saying I can go
on — when the formula occurs to me' (Wittgenstein 1953: #154). The
reproducibility of rules across occasions ought not, then, to blind us to
their occasionedness (this being specifically an analytic rather than a
practical problem).
Returning to the case at hand, we should ask rather: what does the term
we feel we want to use, 'knowing in advance' (that the headline will act as
a [[summary device]]), actually gloss? It is a question of: when constructing
a particular occasion of which one detail is the following of a rule, that
rule can be just then used or followed — it is. a 'being able to go on'
(Wittgenstein 1953: #208) from just here. The occasion and the rule are
inextricably bound and the occasion is the only site on which the rule can,
for analyst or participant, be located. It is only when we come to do X that
the rule for X occurs. For a 'being able to go on' is a 'being able to go on
sustaining just this as "what we are doing"'. We can only talk of 'known
methods of acting' or 'known rules' where the relevant 'knowing' is
intrinsically analyzable by, displayable by, and available to participants as
scenic features of some occasion. The preservation of preferred methods
across innumerable situations gives the 'surface appearance' of repro-
ducibility and just one way of accounting for that reproducibility is to
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analytically reconstruct it as underpinned by some 'deep' storehouse of
rules that preserves them between occasions. Along with the later
Wittgenstein, in addressing the questions of 'knowledge' and 'rule', we
must realize that investigations that ask, for instance, 'Where is the rule
when it is not being used?' will get us nowhere in terms of a study of forms
of social interaction that participants to interaction observably (for
themselves and for analysts alike) orient to as rule-like. One way in which
this orienting is done is, as we have seen, via 'naming practices' that
demand that bits of social interaction get identically reported as 'ques-
tions', 'turns', 'headlines', 'readings', and the rest. Hence, it is, in
congruence with the later Wittgenstein, necessary to see knowledge itself
as an occasioned social accomplishment, a matter of (crudely) 'doing
knowing' or 'displaying knowledge', as opposed to construing it as the
possession of a 'mental store' (common or private). 'Knowledge' has acted
as a useful gloss for participants and some research alike, but for us it is
the work it glosses that must now become a topic. That the analysis of
practical (linguistic) action does not have its 'natural' terminus at the
point where some item(s) of 'knowledge' (from an infinity of things that
could be so titled) is discovered and 'fixed' (ontologized, reified) has
particular significance for our present problem concerning headlines as
[[summary devices]].
Given that the case in hand involves a particular occasion of the
problem of some headline's elliptical character, we can say that the reader
here may be attentive to a possible rule; i.e., that headlines character-
istically act as [[summary devices]]. But of more immediate analytic
concern is the methodical accomplishment of his 'displaying the rule' in
and as conducting a particular discovery procedure by which this headline
turns out to be readable as a [[summary device]] for just this as-yet-unread
article. What we are striving against by formulating the occurrence in this
fashion is the idea that 'the possible movements of a machine are already
there in it in some mysterious way' (Wittgenstein 1953: * 194) and what
we are striving for is to replace this idea by considerations of some
occasion(s) of the 'machine's' working.
Constructing the news: scheduling textual questions and answers as a course
of understanding work
Let us return to the specifics of this constructive, display, discovery, or
understanding work for the case in hand. Hatch (1977: 6) has suggested a
useful formulation here, viz., that summary devices are not peculiar to the
beginnings of accounts, but can reoccur. From the ethnography, we can
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see that the reader takes as [[partial summary devices]] various items that
collect details that have gone before, and do so in an economical format
(similar to pronominalization) so as to render complete rephrasings
unnecessary. Continually the subject reads such things as 'Mr. Fräser'
(t. 6) as collecting 'The Prime Minister Mr. Fräser' (t. 2) or: 'the staff
reductions' (t. 11) as collecting 'the reductions in the number of public
servants' (t. 4-5) and/or 'the new staff ceilings announced in the budget'
(t. 6-7). Further, these [[partial summaries]] are not only read but used in
the production of the ethnography. However, a [[summary device]] that is
in addition to act as a [[preliminary guide]] is different from these, at least
for this reader, in that it is a matter of discovery (etc.) work for him to find
out how it collects the whole of the article. This is the nature of the 'puzzle'
(e. 15).
In being a collection for the whole article, it is taken by the reader to
contain an embedded instruction (pace Gadamer) that can be glossed as:
read the article for its being about the things collected in this headline and
read the things collected in the headline as discoverable (for their sense)
upon a reading of the article. Thus, at least as an analytic reconstruction,
we can say: once the subject has exhausted or been able to 'figure' what
each item in the headline is 'about', he can find he has understood the
whole article and, concomitantly (via one and the same course of work),
once he has understood the whole article he can find what each item in the
headline is 'about'.
1
1 It is important, then, that having read the headline
ongoingly and reflexively acts as a device for his being able to find that the
article makes sense, and reading the article, equally ongoingly and
reflexively, acts in the same way for his understanding of the headline.
The headline, therefore, acts literally like a puzzle, the solution to which
displays to the reader that he has made a competent understanding of the
news item. So to the embedded instruction is added a 'discovery
mechanism'; to wit: once the sense of the title is found, so is the sense of
the article it titles, and vice versa. Thereby, the reader finds not only the
sense of the news item but also that he has understood. The discovery
mechanism can therefore be taken as socially congruous with techniques
such as pronominalization/proverbialization (Sacks 1967b: Nov. 9 and
Nov. 14) whereby understandings may be 'monitored'.
The process of discovery is carried out in a step-wise fashion that is
(where the sense of the headline is concerned) retrospective and (where the
sense of the article is concerned) prospective or anticipatory. The reader
partially expresses this in terms of a series of questions and answers (to the
puzzle). I say 'partially' because, in another sense, the question-answer
(Q-A) format is a useful analytic device only (though see e. 35). Answers-
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to-questions may be found prior to the questions they turn out to have
answered:
Al: The 'areas' are areas of the public service, (e. 29-30)
The headline is thus read as 'having begged the question':
Ql: What areas?
Having found that one part of the puzzle and its solution can be done in
terms of, or terms analogous to, question-answer (Q-A) parts, the reader
often continues to perform (some version of) the procedure. What he finds
is that the second headline item ('areas') has received some clarification,
while the first ('Key') remains part of the puzzle-to-be-solved, despite its
reappearance (or perhaps because of the absence of its explication) in the
first paragraph at t. 3. The question following is therefore scheduled for
answering:
Q2: What is 'key' (or what are, specifically, 'key' areas)?
(e. 31)
While the first paragraph does not alter the problematic status of 'key', a
third answer-to-a-question is found:
A3: The areas are safe in that they will not be affected by reductions in
the number of public servants.
And this answer's concomitant Q-part is thereby read-as-posed by the
headline:
Q3: In what ways are the areas (Qi) 'safe'?
Here there are several related matters. First:
A4: 'Safe' is in quotes because it is a statement.
Q4: Why is 'safe' in quotes?
A4 leads to two further answers-to-questions and their questions:
AS: The Prime Minister, Mr. Fräser, made the statement.
Q5: Who made the statement?
And:
A6: The statement was made at a briefing in Canberra.
Q6: Where was the statement made?
Notice here that for Ai/Qi, Q2, and A3/Q3, and A4/Q4, the Q-parts are read as questions posed by the headline whose answers will (a) clarify the
sense of the headline and, (b) in being clarifiers of the headline, display to
the subject that his understanding of the article is On course'. On the other
hand, A5/Q5 and A6/Qe are generated, not directly by the headline's
problematicity, but by extension of the A4/Q4 pair. Thus while Qi through
Q4 are directly text-originated, Q5 and Q6 are, in some measure, naturally
originated. That is, if quotations display that a statement was made (and
they do this at least on this occasion once the initial paragraph has been
read), a 'natural' requisite of the news item reporting this statement
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appears to be that it will give: by whom and where. Also, it has been read
as supplying 'when' via the same format:
A7: The statement was made on Friday.
Q7: When was the statement made?
(e. 17-20)
Here (in Q5/A5-Q7/A7) the answers are furnished by the article, but the
questions stem from what any competent reader might require of news
reports (which report, e.g., a 'statement') rather than from what any
competent reader might require of just this headline. A further question of
the first (context-independent?) type concerns the pertinence of the sayer
saying this there and then. It concerns the newsworthiness of the event (the
saying) being recounted:
Q8: Why was it said? (e. 34-36)
A further question is then read as the question posed by A3:
Q9: What reductions (Q3/A3) in the number of public servants?
(e. 37)
Now this is dependent upon both 'natural-origination' and an antici-
pation of further clarification of the 'safe' aspect of the headline (text-
origination). I.e., finding out 'what reductions' will entail finding more
about aspects of the reductions' 'safety'. Thus the reader is left with three
unsolved parts of the puzzle: Q2, Q8, and Q9. That is, these questions are
schedules for answering.
Lines 40-53 of the ethnography consist of a guess at an answer for Q 8.
Interestingly, the reader assumes that the answer-to-the-question would
already be known by at least one population of readers; i.e., the question
and its answer would be naturally-originated for this 'ideal-typical'
reading cohort. The same is the case for Q9, for which e. 41-45 is also a
guess-answer. Thus guess-answers A8 and A9 (which turn out to be the
answers later made apparent by the text) are given the provisional status
of answers-for-a-cohort, for 'those not informed'. That is, 'those in-
formed' would take A8 and A9 not as answers to problems of textual
transparency but as matters-of-course.
A8: Why it was said has "to do with its being said in the context of a
controversy about possible loss of jobs in the public service arising out of
budgetary cuts.
A9: .Reductions in the number of public servants announced in the
budget.
So while this investigation cannot produce materials that would suggest
that the item is designed for particular recipients (re: the production
processes leading up to the publication of the item, such as editing,
cutting, etc.), we can say that this reader takes the article as 'recipient
designed' (Garfinkel 1967a; Garfinkel and Sacks 1970); where that
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'design' is a requirement of his understanding of the item and where: 'By
"recipient design" we refer to a multitude of respects in which the talk by a
party ... is constructed or designed in ways which display an orientation
and sensitivity to the particular other(s) who are the co-participants'
(Sacks et al. 1974: 727). That is, the reader is attendant to the article as
designed both for those preinformed on such matters as 'the staff
reductions', 'the pertinence of Eraser's saying this', and so on and (once
the relevant answers are later 'spelled out' in the article) for those who are
not so informed. Readers, as it were, appear to impute recipient design to
(at least some, including this) text(s). In each case, however, the reader
takes it that talk worthy of the title 'news' should be 'additional' to that
information already held by the respective reception cohorts (considered
as ideal types). Now, the present reader, in that he can identify himself
with both groups, acknowledges that the information-held-in-common by
these two ideal cohorts is not identical. In fact his criteria for the
construction of such 'populations' consist of matters relating to the topic
'information held'. He has first considered that — via the text's insertion
of 'the' in 'the reductions ...' at t. 4 — the article was designed for the
preinformed population alone. I.e., it seemed to be dealing with infor-
mation already held by that population and to constitute an 'addition' to
that information; the use of 'the' (where it is otherwise optional) being a
means by which speakers can show that they expect the object under
consideration (here, 'reductions') to be known in common by themselves
and their interlocutors. Upon the article then 'spelling out' just what
reductions these are or — depending on the ideal cohort — turn out to be,
he realizes that the article is 'covering its tracks' as a contender for the title
'newsworthy* by catering now to the 'uninformed' population also. On the
one hand, it risks being Old-hat' (e. 124) and impinging on the competence
of the 'informed' group. On the other, it risks being overelliptical by not
presenting sufficient background for the 'uninformed' group to make a
competent understanding of it. We have already said that any reader
should be able to monitor her/his ongoing understanding of the article by
ongoingly finding it to be a sense-making device for the headline and vice
versa. Now if the choice is between Old-hat' and ellipsis, this is the same
thing as saying that the sense-making device will be either overeffective
(giving more information than is necessary) or undereffective (giving less
information than is necessary). This is expressed in the ethnography as
'taking the news down to a level of what readers wowWknow about' (e. 100)
but not beyond. Going beyond this 'cut-off point for newsworthiness —
e.g., by including 'Canberra, A.C.T., so many miles from Sydney,
Australia' (e. 104) — is placing the status of this as 'news' in jeopardy.
The problem of having two ideal reading populations, and thereby two
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respective cut-off points, requires careful sequencing of the item's utter-
ances,
1
2 and equally careful readerly attention to that sequencing. The
reader decides that the article faces this problem by having informed-
cohort-specific 'news' sequentially prior to uninformed-cohort-specific
'news'. Thereby, any actual reading cohort from the first population can
literally 'stop reading' once it finds that the headline has been fully
explicated; that is, once the sense-making device is beginning to become
observably overeffective (e. 76-78) or where the article is beginning to
state 'the obvious'. Overall, the reader is attentive to this formatting as an
economy. The 'informed' group could discontinue their readings once the
'explication' of the headline was beginning to look overeffective, say, at
the end of the first paragraph — which assumes, for the stage we have
reached currently, that they have prior information regarding the un-
solved question of what 'key' areas are (Q2). Thereby, the only un-
economical activity over the course of such a reading would be their
minimal effort spent finding the 'extra' utterances to actually be un-
economical. The 'uninformed' group, according to this reader, would
necessarily perform a 'complete' reading.
The reader in our present investigation, however, decides that even the
'informed' group would be able to gain information over and above that
which they held prior to starting reading (and that this too would facilitate
their solution to the headline's puzzle) from reading beyond t. 5. This
concerns the 'safety' aspect of Q3. Here the reader finds that his
previously-arrived-at version of A3 was 'incomplete' (e. 60-66) and that
this would be the case whichever group or population he was a member of.
A revised version of A3 is arrived at, whereby he finds retrospectively what
'safe' 'really' is:
A3'r The areas (Qi/AO are safe in that, though there will be reductions,
these will be made by normal wastage and not by retrenchments.
From this, there is a similarly revised answer to Q8:
Ag: It was said in the context of someone's fearing that there would be
job losses owing to the budget cuts.
Hence a new question can be posed and an answer is first guessed at and
later found to be presented in the article:
Q10: Who fears losses of jobs? (e. 67)
A10: I,guess the ACOA (e. 67)
A10': Public service union officials (e. 118)
Interestingly, now that both A3 and A8 have undergone revisions
(becoming A3' and A8'), the subject takes it that 'answers' are not
necessarily 'final answers', i.e., they are subject to revision later in the
article. Thereby, he selects A5 as a possible answer-to-be-revised
(e. 113-114); acknowledges that Q 2 is still scheduled for answering (e. 114);
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takes already-revised answers (A3 and A8) as contenders for even further
revision (e. 111-112 and 113-115); and admits that AIO had only been a
guess and is still open to the presentation of an answer (e. 115). It is a matter
of some difficulty, however, to gloss this work as 'doing mistrusting'.
1
3
In fact, the next thing the subject finds is a presented answer to Qi0 that
he reads as substantially close to his own prior (less general) guess. Via
reading the last paragraph as 'allaying fears' (e. 137), he is then able to
produce a guess-answer to the still-scheduled Q2. The answer to Qi0 has
been 'the ACOA/Public Service union officials' but this was only with
respect to the topic 'fears of losing jobs'. Now the reader, possibly upon
realizing that 'key' is not going to be finally and presentedly cleared up,
has to inspect the text before him for a possible solution. Thus 'fears' is
treated as extendable from one domain (fears of losing jobs) to another
(fears of services being badly affected owing to loss of jobs) in order to
furnish a 'fit' between 'key' in the headline and some utterance in the
article — a nice display of the subject taking the article and headline as
constituting a 'discovery mechanism' whatever might or might not be
'presented' in either. Thereby A2 is arrived at, if only in guess form:
A2: Key areas are those that involve services directly affecting the
public.
We can see that, upon arriving at the end of the article, the reader is able
to take the headline as being this particular article's [[summary device]],
insofar as all its items have been rendered transparent in their various
fashions (by presentation, by guess, by revision, and so on). Likewise, the
reader can find that he has undertaken the appropriate discovery
mechanism entailed in the elliptical headline's embedded instruction and,
thereby, performed a competent reading of the article. A further offshoot
of this is that the Object' [[the end of the article]] should have been marked
in this way (suggesting its problematicity) throughout the above analysis,
for [[the end of the article]] is not merely constituted by the finish of print
at some physical location or by arrival at a new headline, photograph,
cartoon, etc. It is constituted by an interaction between these Objective
facts' and the completion of the discovery mechanism. I.e., the [[end]] may
occur both once a physical boundary is reached and once the headline's
puzzle has been cleared up. 'May' in that there need not be coincidence
here.
We have also seen that answers to questions-read-as-posed-by-the-
headline were able to entail further questions that required guessed-at
and/or presented answers before the headline could be made sense of. The
Q-A pairs, that is, did not give direct access to the headline.s sense, but
could work through subordinate Q-A pairs that they generated in order to
furnish that sense. Further, there were also naturally-originated questions
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that had only tacit relations with some actual headline-problem and that
required answers on the basis of information expectably found in news
items.
Conclusion
The findings of the analysis have concerned, then, the making or
production of a social object glossable as 'a competent understanding'.
The means of producing this object was seen to be a series of tasks that we
can call 'understanding work' and that, in contrast with Gadamer's thesis,
could not be merely something 'which happens to us'. That work was seen
to be performed simultaneously on (or with) the text and as (or in) the
reading. Further, the understanding work is seen as a detail o/the reading.
Understanding work itself is, therefore, seeable as involving a form of
reflexivity, by virtue of its being performed on details of the reading (as
opposed to the text) and as a detail of the reading. In short, understanding
includes finding not only that 'utterance X is about ...' but also finding
that Ί have understood'. Understanding work makes provision for itself
as one detail among many details within its scope. In a certain sense, then,
there is a self-containedness about the reading-situation we have in-
vestigated involving a mechanism for the reader's reflexive monitoring of
his own understanding.
1
4 A bold guess might suggest that this is an
integral feature of the reading of elliptical prefaces or presummaries.
By 'self-containedness', I do not intend that this occasion of reading is
unrelated to other occasions of reading or to other 'social experience'.
First, the item was read as part of an ongoing 'story' or running-news-
item. It was inextricably englobed in a larger account. Here we can take as
an example the reading of 'the' in 'the reductions in the number of public
servants' (t. 4-5), where 'the' was taken as ensuring, (a) for those who are
following the running-item, that this particular addition to it is 'the next in
the series'. 'The,' we should like to say, 'refers back' to or 'assumes'
information already held by readers of the running-item-so-far. Thereby,
substantive knowledge (information) is just one class of accomplished ob-
jects handlable by routine methods of, in this case, the performance of read-
ings. I.e., we are interested in substantive knowledge as a topic only insofar
as we can detect routine methods for its accomplishment or use, where one
of those uses is the reading of'the' in this text. Further, the reading of'the'
acknowledges, for readers of the running-itme, how the particular article
in question is part of (or the latest addition to) that running-item. I.e., it
collects 'those reductions already reported at some previous time, as news-
at-that-time'. And (b) it ensures, for those who are not following the
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running-item (for those for whom 'this is the first I've heard of it'), that,
but not how, this particular part-of-the-running-item is part of some
(unknown) running-item.
As the reading subject says, at a point where analysis and ethnography
overlap (e. 130-133), the readings of'the' is background-dependent for
that reader's imputed 'informed group', while it is scene-dependent for his
'uninformed group'. It is background-dependent in that, for the 'informed'
ideal cohort, it either (a) requires no in-the-text prepertinentization or (b) is
taken to be prepertinentized by earlier utterances of the running-item-so-
far. It is scene-dependent in that, for the 'uninformed' ideal cohort, it is
read as requiring some postpertinentization, which comes at t. 6-8. Note: it
is only upon discovering that some postpertinentization has been done that
the reader is confident in postulating two ideal cohorts. (See McHoul
[1978a: 228-291 and 309-312] on pertinentizing.)
By reading 'the', for example, in this way, the reader takes his ability to
construct a methodical reading as evidence for the text's methodical
construction. Further, he takes this construction to be open to plain view
and not 'just for me'. While the in situ production of the text cannot be an
investigable object for the present research, the discovery of how and that
'hearers' of texts, in producing a reading, are attendant to assumed or
imputed aspects of the methodical work of producing texts is highly
significant, in that it creates a distinct overlap between reading and
dialoguic exchanges in terms of participants' methods. The discovery of a
'family resemblance' between textual and conversational discourse is
significant in that it renders a conclusion much closer to Gadamer's
hermeneutics than to Habermas's universal pragmatics. At the same time,
it has become equally obvious, over the course of this investigation, that
the thesis of readerly passivity implicit in the view that 'understanding is
like a process which happens to us' is a radical (and possibly ironic)
underestimation of the mutual and reflexive constitution of reading
situations by texts and their readers.
1
5 Last, the so-called 'imponderability
thesis', which holds that readers cannot 'know in advance' how a stretch
of discourse will 'turn out', appears quite problematic in the light of our
investigation. The reading we have looked at was primarily constructed in
terms of conceptions of 'what is to come'. It was prospective as well as
retrospective.
Misgeld has begged the fundamental question of whether we speak
through language or language through us. As strict alternatives, the
question is badly put; for it masks the vast amount of work yet to be done
on the relation of linguistic resources and their use, on the one hand, and
language production practices and conversational/textual objects, on the
other.
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Notes
1. Work on rules and the phenomenon of 'rule' can be found throughout the oeuvre of the
late Harvey Sacks (1963, 1966, 1967a, b, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972a, b, c, d, 1973,
1974, 1975, n.d.).
2. For the distinction between rules and generalizations, see Shwayder (1965: 246-247).
3. Coser (1976: 35) prefers to take 'situation-specific' studies as those that describe 'mental
acts of consciousness' and context-free studies as those that describe 'communicative
exchanges between actors'. It is fairly evident, however, that very little ethnometho-
dology is now being done in relation to the former and that the situation-specific/
situation-free 'controversy' is actually a question of different strategies for examining
the latter. This obfuscation out of the way, we can now hear Coser's range of choices
for ethnomethodology: '... either [ethnomethodology] attend[s] to the situation-
specific, context-related aspects of social actions, and therefore [is] limited to descriptive
accounts, or [it] will attend to social forms that abstract from specific contents and
allow generalizations that go beyond the particularities of situated meanings' (Coser
1976: 35). The work following this footnote attempts to address what appears here as a
'choice' and argues that studies of (situated) social actions have already shown that the
occasionedness and the reproducibility of social actors' methods are not, for those
actors, mutually exclusive kinds of criteria but are, rather, mutually dependent.
4. The first research object is coterminous with the discovery of methods (or 'rules') for
undertaking 'the same' language-game on different occasions within a form of life. The
second research object is coterminous with the possibility of discovering family
resemblances between language-games comprising a form of life (culture?).
5. As opposed to the notion that materials be inspected for their relative strength or
. weakness vis-a-vis the events they report, I prefer the position suggested by D. J. Hatch
(personal communication, 41678) that they be treated as reminders. The term nicely
acknowledges and dissolves the troubles that can arise when too much is made of the
possible confusion of ethnography and event. For one paper that does treat the notion
of ethnographic 'adequacy', see McDermott et al. (1979).
6. Here I am addressing the question of 'analysis' as a researcherly matter, i.e., analysis
that would include descriptions of participants'' on-the-spot analyses of utterances as a
maximal part of its work.
7. Persons interested in a couple of ethnographies that occur naturally in the work of
literary critics and that attempt to narrate the processes by which such people perform
their readings might refer to Lodge (1966: 80-81) or to Wellek (I960-: 419). These
particular 'reflections' coincide with much hermeneutic work and with Garfinkel's
(1967a: 76ff. and 40) work on 'the documentary method of interpretation'.
8. I cannot go into details of the deliberations leading to this conclusion. Relevant
materials may be found in Turner (1971) and Mehan and Wood (1975: 229-238).
9. See McHoul (1978a: 309-316).
10. I set off each of these activities or accomplishable objects with double square brackets,
'[[ ]]', to indicate that they are glosses for immense amounts of detailed work, where the
explication of that work as methodical ways of producing the objects so set off would
be the potential topics of many reading-analyses. In short, the device exists as a
mnemonic against the tendency to hypostatize social activities. The brackets are
glossable as: this 'thing' is through-and-through a doable matter.
11. I use 'about' here in the old Lancashire sense, i.e., as in 'What are you aboutT (What
are you doing?). I.e., what the headline is 'about' — what it 'means' — is a question
concerning what is done with it, what use is made of it.
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12. Another way that news items can handle the matter is by making a topic of the fact of
possible differential information across hearing/viewing cohorts as in the following
opening to a TV news item: 'Many people turned out today in Canberra to see Prince
Charles who, as you're probably well aware by now, is visiting Australia.' (Australian
Broadcasting Commission, 1977)
13. To what extent the existence of two answers to Q3 (and possibly also to Q8) could
constitute 'misinformation', given that A3 and A3' fall on opposite sides of the reader's
constructed cut-off point for the 'informed' cohort's competent understanding, is a
separate matter. Note here, for example, Watson's (1973) careful handling of his
description of public address announcements at a racetrack after [[the death]] of a
racing driver. He does not deal with the announcement (which does not specifically
mention 'a death') in terms of 'misinformation' — implying a critical, moral judgment
— but in terms of a 'missing topic'. The present account of'two answers' can be treated
in a similar way — i.e., upon the production of A3', the reader discovers that his reading
up to that point has 'really' been performed with some topic 'missing' (safe=normal
wastage, not 'no wastage'). Compare this, then, with Watson's later discovering that Jo
Siffert's death was what, in fact, happened.
Nevertheless, that a news item should be so constructed as to have it appear that a
politically liberal outcome (no retrenchments in 'key' areas) was intended only later to
divulge a politically less liberal result (normal wastage [in other areas?]) is certainly
suspicious, especially since at least one ideal-cohort might have already found the
headline's solution and ceased reading. This would be, for those so interested, a
possible entry point for a critical sociology. Here attention might be turned to the
following: the only resolution of the problem would require a fuller delineation of what
'key' areas are. As things stand, the indexicality of this pronouncement is such that any
action re retrenchments/cutbacks could be seen subsequently to have 'really' been in
accord with it 'all along'. Fräser, that is, still has a completely free hand despite these
attempts to 'cool out' the controversy.
14. Many will still argue that this analysis concentrates too fully on the 'normal' case of
understanding, where 'normal' is considered appropriate in contrast to 'what is strange,
novel or not understood' (Misgeld 1977: 330). However, I would contend that a
concentration on a situation where the reader initially did not know 'what the hell'
(e. 14) some stretch of talk was about loosens the complete effectiveness of this
objection. Of course, what it shows is that there are routine methods for handling/
encountering 'what is strange, novel ...', etc. Attention should be drawn at this point
to Schegloff et al.'s (1977) work on routine methods for the accomplishment of
repairing items of conversation considered by interactants as worthy of such cor-
rectional work, where one category of such items includes those that might be located in
the hermeneutic tradition as 'misunderstandings'.
15. A conclusion for ethnomethodology per se might be that Mehan and Wood's (1975:
179-204) rescuing of ethnomethodology for the hermeneutic tradition is quite ill-
considered. One concomitant of such a projected synthesis is, of course, that Mehan
and Wood must take on Gadamer's Ontologizing shift' over and against 'constitutive
ethnomethodology'. While their deliberations over such a move involve a discussion of
'the reflexivity of reflexivity' problem, it is now plain that this move's solution to the
problem spells the end of considerations of reflexivity simpliciter. Ethnomethodology, in
synthesis with hermeneutics, rejoins normative sociology.
Brought to you by | Murdoch University Library (Murdoch University Library)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 7/13/12 4:27 AM124 A.W. McHoul
References
Adler, M. J. and van Doren, C. (1972). How to Read a Book. New York: Simon and
Schuster.
Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977). Canberra news. November 2, 1977.
Canberra Times, The (1976). Key areas 'safe'. August 23, 1976, p. 3.
—(1977a). Fräser sees Kerr: Election date expected today. October 27, 1977, p. 1.
—(1977b). Bill for one head. October 27, 1977, p. 3.
Coser, Lewis A. (1976). Reply to my critics. American Sociologist 11, 33-38.
Gadamer, H. G. (1975). Hermeneutics and social science. Cultural Hermeneutics 2, 307-316.
Garfinkel, Harold (1967a). Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall.
—(1967b). Practical sociological reasoning: Some features in the work of the Los Angeles
Suicide Prevention Center. In Essays in Self-Destruction, E. S. Shneidman (ed.), 171-187.
New York: Science House.
Garfinkel, Harold and Sacks, Harvey (1970). On formal structures of practical actions. In
Theoretical Sociology: Perspectives and Developments, J. C. McKinney and E. A.
Tiryakian (eds.), 337-366. New York: Appleton.
Habermas, Jürgen (1973). Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Hatch, David J. (1977). Ideology as method: The analysis of accounting practices.
Unpublished manuscript, University of Manchester, Department of Sociology.
—(1978). The analysis of cultural objects: Organizational and referential parameters of
utterance design. Analytic Sociology 1. (References are to draft manuscript.)
Lakatos, Imre (1974). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programs. In
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), 91-196.
London: Cambridge University Press.
Lodge, David (1966). Language of Fiction: Essays in criticism and verbal analysis of the
English novel. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Malcolm, Norman (1958). Ludwig Wittgenstein: A memoir. London: Oxford University
Press.
Marx, Karl (1968). Theses on Feuerbach. In Selected works of Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels,
28-30. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
McDennott, R. P., Gospodinoff, Kenneth and Aron, Jeffrey (1979). Criteria for an
ethnographically adequate description of concerted activities and their contexts. Semiotica
24, 245-278.
McHoul, Alexander W. (1978a). Telling how texts talk: From readings of Wittgenstein,
Schütz, ethnomethodology and the sociology of literature to the analysis of readings.
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University (Canberra).
—(1978b). Wittgenstein and criticism: Towards a praxiological view of the text. New
Literature Review 3, 49-57.
—(1978c). Ethnomethodology and literature: Preliminaries to a sociology of reading. Poetics
7, 113-120.
—(1978d). The organization of turns at formal talk in the classroom. Language in Society 7,
183-213.
—(forthcoming). The practical methodology of reading in science and everyday life: Reading
Althusser reading Marx. To appear in Philosophy of the Social Sciences.
McSweeney, W. (1973). Meaning, context and situation. European Journal of Sociology 14,
137-153.
Mehan, Hugh and Wood, Houston (1975). The Reality of Ethnomethodology. New York:
John Wiley.
Misgeld, Dieter (1977). Discourse and conversation: The theory of communicative com-
Brought to you by | Murdoch University Library (Murdoch University Library)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 7/13/12 4:27 AMHermeneutic and ethnomethodological formulations 125
petence and hermeneutics in the light of the debate between Habermas and Gadamer.
Cultural Hermeneutics 4, 321-344.
Richards, I. A. (1959). How to Read a Page: a course in efficient reading with an introduction
to a hundred great words. Boston: Beacon Press.
Sacks, Harvey (1963). Sociological description. Berkeley Journal of Sociology 8, 1-16.
—(1966). The search for help: No one to turn to. Unpublished doctoral dissertation,
University of California at Berkeley.
—(1967a). The search for help: No one to turn to. In Essays in Self-Destruction, E. S.
Shneidman (ed.), 203-233. New York: Science House.
—(1967b). Unpublished lecture notes.
—(1968). Unpublished lecture notes.
—(1969). Unpublished lecture notes.
—(1970). Unpublished lecture notes.
—(1971). Unpublished lecture notes.
—(1972a). An initial investigation of the usability of conversational data for doing
sociology. In Studies in Social Interaction, David Sudnow (ed.), 3-74. New York: Free
Press.
—(1972b). Notes on police assessment of moral character. In Studies in Social Interaction,
David Sudnow (ed.), 280-293. New York: Free Press.
—(1972c). On the analysability of stories by children. In Directions in Sociolinguistics, John
J. Gumperz and Dell Hymes (eds.), 216-232. New York: Holt.
—(1972d). Unpublished lecture notes.
—(1973). On some puns with some intimations. In Monograph 25, Linguistics and Language
Science, Roger Shuy (ed). Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
—(1974). An analysis of the course of a joke's telling in conversation. In Explorations in the
Ethnography of Speaking, Richard Bauman and Joel Sherzer (eds.), 337-353. London:
Cambridge University Press.
—(1975). Everyone has to lie. In Sociocultural Dimensions of Language Use, M. Sanches and
B. G. Blount (eds.), 57-79. New York: Academic Press.
—(n.d.). Aspects of the Sequential Organization of Conversation. Unpublished draft
manuscript.
Sacks, Harvey, Schegloff, Emmanuel A., and Jefferson, Gail (1974). A simplest systematics
for the organization of turn-taking for conversation. Language 50, 696-735.
Schegloff, Emmanuel A. (1967). The first five seconds. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University
of California at Berkeley.
—(1968). Sequencing in conversational openings. American Anthropologist 70, 1075-1095.
—(1972). Notes on a conversational practice: Formulating place. In Studies in Social
Interaction, David Sudnow (ed.), 73-119. New York: Free Press.
Schegloff, Emmanuel A., Jefferson, Gail, and Sacks, Harvey (1977). The preference for self-
correction in the organization of repair in conversation. Language 53, 361-382.
Sharrock, W. W. (1974). On owning knowledge. In Ethnomethodology, Roy Turner (ed.),
45-53. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Shwayder, D. S. (1965). The Stratification of Behavior. New York: Humanities Press.
Turner, Roy (1971). Words, utterances and activities. In Understanding Everyday Life, J. D.
Douglas (ed.), 169-189. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Watson, D. R. (1973). The public announcement of fatality. Working Papers in Cultural
Studies 4, 5-20.
Wellek, Rene (1960). From the viewpoint of literary criticism: Closing statement. In Style in
Language, Thomas A. Sebeok (ed.), 408-419. New York: MIT Press and John Wiley.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.
—(1958). The Blue and Brown Books. Oxford: Blackwell.
Brought to you by | Murdoch University Library (Murdoch University Library)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 7/13/12 4:27 AM126 A. W. McHoul
Alexander W. McHoul (b. 1952) is a lecturer in Sociology in the Department of Education,
James Cook University of North Queensland, Australia. His principal research interests are
analysis of natural conversation, analysis of routine methods of reading and textual
communication, 'and sociology of literature and culture. His publications include 'Ethno-
methodology and literature: Preliminaries to a sociology of reading' (1978),
 4The organi-
zation of turns at formal talk in the classroom' (1978), Selected References to Coenetics (The
study of behavioral organization of face-to-face interaction) — Special Issue of Sign Language
Studies (1979; with Adam Kendon, Matthew Ciolek, and Rob Elzinga), and 'Cultural
creation: Unsociological aspects of Goldman's sociology of culture' (forthcoming).
Brought to you by | Murdoch University Library (Murdoch University Library)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 7/13/12 4:27 AM